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Abstract: The aim of this paper is to provide an interpretation of Agamben’s theological 
genealogy of economy that will show its significance for investigations in the field of political 
economy. The only way to connect the discourses of economic theology and political 
economy is to show that the former is not concerned with questions proper to the sphere of 
economics, but rather deals with a more general problem – the problem of human praxis.      
I will show that what is at stake in Agamben’s endeavors is a critique of theological, that is 
metaphysical, presuppositions about the concept of human praxis, a critique which can only 
be carried out on the basis of a theological genealogy, in particular of the Trinitarian 
oikonomia. The text will focus on the notion of liturgy in Agamben’s genealogical 
investigations as a theological paradigm for the capitalist management of human life           
(i.e. praxis) and will close with some initial remarks on the possible application of Agamben’s 
theological genealogy of economy to a Marxist critique of political economy, especially to      
a critique of the distinction between productive and unproductive labor. 
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The aim of this paper is to provide an interpretation of Agamben’s theological genealogy of 
economy that will show its significance for investigations in the field of political economy. 
The only way to connect the discourses of economic theology and political economy is to 
show that the former is not concerned with the production and circulation of use value 
(goods) or exchange value (money) or with the peculiar commodity that is labor, but rather 
deals with a more general problem – the problem of human praxis. I will show that what is at 
stake in Agamben’s endeavors is a critique of theological, that is metaphysical, 
presuppositions about the concept of human praxis, a critique which can only be carried out 
on the basis of a theological genealogy, in particular of the Trinitarian oikonomia. The text will 
focus on the notion of liturgy in Agamben’s genealogical investigations as a theological 
paradigm for the capitalist management of human life (i.e. praxis) and will close with some 
initial remarks on the possible application of Agamben’s theological genealogy of economy to 
a Marxist critique of political economy, especially to a critique of the distinction between 
productive and unproductive labor. Its aim is to show the need for a political philosophy of 
human praxis, which itself must be confronted with its theological roots in order to provide 
any critique of political economy. Agamben’s theological genealogy of economy can help in 
elaborating a more philosophical background for a Marxist critique of political economy, first 
of all because of its focus on the problem of potentiality, which was also essential for Marx in 
his preparatory studies for Capital. Therefore I will link Agamben’s genealogy of liturgy (both 
the liturgy of the monastic life and the liturgy of the ecclesiastical office) to Results of the 
Immediate Production Process, the unpublished sixth chapter of the first volume of Capital, in 
which Marx develops his understanding of the subsumption of labor under capital. It is my 
view that in Agamben’s work we can find a broader paradigm of a liturgical subsumption of praxis 
that might prove useful for a research into the subsumption of life in the contemporary 
capitalist economy. 
In a preface to his Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844 Marx wrote, with a wit 
familiar to his readers, that anyone “who tries to hide his complete ignorance and intellectual 
poverty […] has yet to furnish the first proof that besides his theological family affairs he has 
anything to contribute to a discussion of worldly matters” (Marx 1988, 14–15). The 
contemporary discourses on economic theology try nevertheless to show that the discussion 
of the worldly matters must at some point come to grips with the theological family affairs1. 
 
                                               
1  This article is a result of  a research grant “Critique of  the Politico-Economic Theology in the 
Philosophy of  Giorgio Agamben” funded from the specified-user subsidiary for research projects conducted 
by doctoral students of  the Institute of  Philosophy and Sociology of  PAN. 
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Economic theology and political economy 
The initial inspiration for this text came from a young Italian politician and philosopher2, 
who formulated a thesis that the contemporary revival of economic theology in Italy is          
a form of conceptual smokescreen, or even an intellectual diversion, that allows for 
theoretical research into the problems of political economy – meaning of course Marxist 
political economy – without taking up the discourse of political economy itself. Although the 
thesis looks at first glance like a valid one, bearing some heuristic value, it provokes            
the question: why would such a smokescreen even be necessary? Leaving aside the problem 
of an ideological climate in contemporary Europe which might prevent a discourse based on 
Marxist economics from gaining recognition, the proliferation of academic analyses in the 
field of economic theology makes pressing a more general question: what is the relationship 
between a critique of economic theology, or a theological genealogy of economy, and political 
economy? Are they just two different discourses explicating the same problems from 
different perspectives, or is an analysis or genealogy of economic theology really able to 
deliver a theoretical insight into political economy that the latter is – at least to a certain 
extent – unable to provide on its own? The latest books on the subject by Roberto Esposito 
(2013) and Elettra Stimilli (2011; 2015) have shown that the economic-theological paradigm 
makes possible a very productive coupling of discourses which links contemporary 
governance by debt with the questions of the formation of subjectivity and contemporary 
forms of governmentality. One might argue about whether they really offer any theoretical 
added value to the research carried out by, among others, Maurizio Lazzarato (2012; 2015), 
but it is especially the critique of the dispositive of the person in Esposito’s Due which proves 
that analysis of the paradigm of political and economic theology can widen the genealogy of 
contemporary subjectivity and refer it to the general context of the theory of law and politics. 
The question of subjectivity and praxis is central also to Stimilli’s Il debito del vivente (2011), 
where the praxis of ascesis is being explored precisely in its inoperational character, which can 
be opposed to the operative character of both capitalism and religion. 
 Therefore, economic theology doesn’t provide a simple smokescreen for Marxist 
research into political economy. Although one might refer to the famous “theological 
niceties” that appear at the end of the first chapter of Capital (Marx 1990, 163), the dialectic 
method used by Marx deals rather with the common dialectical roots of theological and 
economic thinking, than with a call for a theological genealogy with its own method or 
presuppositions. A theological genealogy of economy doesn’t give us insight into the nature 
of value, the mode of capitalist production or the essence of money, but into a concept of 
                                               
2  It was Michele Fiorillo from the Possibile party at the conference “Immunity and Modernity” held in 
2015 in Leuven. 
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subjectivity and a notion of praxis that provide the core of modern forms of governance of 
capitalist societies. Therefore, as a genealogy and simultaneously a critique of the notion       
of human praxis, it constitutes a suitable conceptual tool with which to confront (neo)liberal 
economics, focused first of all on the rationality and action of human beings3. This is most 
evident in Giorgio Agamben’s famous Il regno e la gloria, a second segment of the second 
volume (II.2) of the Homo sacer series4, which Agamben himself declares is a theological 
genealogy not of Marx’s critique of political economy, but of Foucault’s investigations into 
the governmentality of modern societies (Agamben 2011, xi). Foucault’s late work constitutes 
the main point of reference for practically all attempts at a critique of economic theology in 
contemporary Italian political philosophy (Gentili 2015), as may be evidenced by the central 
role that is played in those endeavors by the notion of the dispositif (Agamben 2009; Esposito 
2013, 4)5. Agamben not only traces the roots of the Latin term dispositio in the Greek 
oikonomia, but also translates it using Heidegger’s notion of Ge-stell (Agamben 2011, 252)6, 
thus situating his theological genealogy of economy not only in the field of the archeology of 
power and the hermeneutics of the subject, but also in a horizon of the critique and 
dismantling of metaphysics. In Opus Dei, the last segment of the second volume of the series, 
dealing with the archeology of the office, Agamben develops further the significance of his 
investigations into economic theology for a “history of being”: 
One can ask to what extent this reconstruction of the determinate influence of 
Christian theology on the history of being is indebted to the privilege accorded to the 
creationist paradigm. It is by virtue of this model that Heidegger could think the 
essence of technology as production and disposition and the Gestell as the securing of 
the real in the mode of availability. But precisely for this reason he was not able to see 
                                               
3  It is clearly visible in the overriding role praxeology plays in the classical works of  neoliberal theory, 
especially in Ludwig von Mises’ Human Action: A Treatise on Economics (von Mises 1949). The prevalence of  the 
notions of  subjectivity and action in neoliberalism is also present in Foucault’s reconstruction of  neoliberal 
biopolitics (Foucault 2010).  
4  I put so much emphasis on the classification of  Il regno e la gloria in Agamben’s “sacred man” series since 
the numeration of  volumes and segments is not a chronological, but a logical one. There exists, in my opinion, 
an organizing principle that explains not only the dispositio of  the books in the series but also why only the 
second and the fourth volumes are divided into segments. To put it briefly: the first volume introduces          
the general problem of  the series – the relation of  life to power and the question of  the division (e.g. between 
dzoe and bios) that accompanies the concept of  power and politics in Western philosophy and political theory. 
The second volume deals with different dispositives of  power (state of  exception, glory, sacrament, oath, 
office, etc.), which explains its division into segments. The third volume (Agamben 2002) presents the most 
radical effect of  the diagrammatic division of  life into bios and dzoe in Western politics and therefore constitutes 
a sort of  passage to the fourth volume, which tries to conceptualize a form-of-life, life beyond the division 
introduced by the dispositives of  power. 
5  For a critique of  Agamben’s use of  the concept of  dispositif, see Pasquinelli 2015. 
6  Esposito performs the same conceptual operation, although from a different genealogical perspective 
(Esposito 2013, 20). 
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what has today become perfectly obvious, and that is that one cannot understand the 
metaphysics of technology if one understands it only in the form of production. It is 
just as much and above all governance and oikonomia, which in the last analysis can 
even provisionally put casual production between parentheses in the name of a more 
refined and diffuse form of management of human beings and of things (Agamben 
2013a, 61). 
A theological genealogy of economy can therefore be understood as a critique of 
metaphysics: not metaphysics of production, i.e. of making entities into a resource for 
industrialized production, but rather metaphysics of governance – which also means 
organization of the production process, or rather organization and management of the 
production and reproduction of life (a management of life that reduces it to its own 
production and reproduction). It still remains an open question whether Agamben accepts 
the reactionary Heidegger’s stance towards the possibilities of technological development, 
and it may be the case that the interpretation of the above paragraph from Opus Dei will 
become the criterion for distinguishing the conservative and progressive interpretations of 
Agamben’s thought in the future, but it is clear that the problem Agamben himself declares 
to be the stake of his investigations into economic theology is the analysis of the metaphysical 
foundations of modern governmentality7. A corollary thesis would be that only a theological 
genealogy gives insight into the metaphysical foundations of governance. However, this still 
leaves us with no answer to the question: what is the relation between the theological 
genealogy of economy – a critique of metaphysics of governance – and political economy?  
Foucault’s genealogical approach to power and subjectivity and Heidegger-inspired 
dismantling of metaphysics constitute the proper conceptual horizon for Agamben’s 
theological genealogy of economy, since the Italian philosopher is first of all interested in the 
question of human praxis. Technically one should say that the proper stake is the notion of 
life which Agamben tries to free from the fundamental distinction between dzoe and bios 
(Agamben 1998), vita and regula (Agamben 2013b) or, finally, between dynamis and energeia 
(Agamben 2014). But this doesn’t change the fact that every investigation Agamben has 
undertaken in the field of political philosophy, political theology and the theory of power was 
carried out from the perspective of the problem of human praxis. To put it briefly: the key to 
understanding the contemporary mechanisms of power, including forms of economic power, 
                                               
7  Just as his whole philosophical project can be summarized as a genealogical investigation into the 
metaphysical presuppositions of  politics: “ontology and politics correspond perfectly with each other” 
(Agamben 2014, 173).  
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lies, according to Agamben, in a properly philosophical research into the concept of human 
praxis8, which requires also an economical-theological genealogy. 
This may also help us to understand why Agamben’s investigations into the 
genealogy of economy have often been misinterpreted as applying directly to economic 
questions. A short review of some of these (mis)interpretations may also facilitate a further 
elaboration of the relation between economic theology and political economy, since they 
show exactly what is not the true problem of Agamben’s work. The reference to the term 
“biopolitics” and Foucault’s genealogy of biopower has placed his investigations in the 
context of research into contemporary forms of the (re)production of life which came to be 
defined as “biopolitical”: that is, productive of bios itself (languages, affects, ideas, signs, 
information, relations, etc.)9. Hardt and Negri, the main theorists of biopolitical labor, have 
underlined the unproductive character of Agamben’s concept of biopolitics: “Agamben 
transposes biopolitics in a theological-political key, claiming that the only possibility of 
rupture with biopower resides in ‘inoperative’ activity […] completely incapable                   
of constructing an alternative” (Hardt and Negri 2009, 58)10. Agamben’s later work on 
economic theology has only strengthened his emphasis on the inoperativity of human life, 
making it clear that it is not the biopolitical labor, the productivity of life which exceeds any 
imposed capitalist measure or value form, but exactly the unproductive aspect of life that is the 
stake in his genealogy of oikonomia. The sphere of production, i.e. productivity of social life, 
and labor, cannot therefore be an object of his interest. 
The question of labor is nevertheless closely related to the problem of praxis. 
Foucault, Hardt and Negri have pointed out that labor in Marx is first of all a production of 
man by man (Hardt and Negri 2009, 136), i.e. the praxis of man’s self-production. Agamben 
targets this topic directly in Il regno e la gloria, where he writes: 
When Marx […] thinks the being of man as praxis, and praxis as the self-production 
of man, he is after all secularizing the theological idea of the being of creatures as 
divine operation. After having conceived of being as praxis, if we take God away and 
                                               
8  There’s no place in this text to compare Agamben’s and Esposito’s critiques of  economic theology, but 
it might suffice as an initial contribution to such a comparison to state that, while Agamben focuses on the 
problem of  human praxis as unfounded and unrelated metaphysically to the mechanisms of  power, Esposito 
tries to formulate an ontology of  communitas of  living subjects. That is, while Agamben explicates life with the 
help of  a notion of  praxis (to be precise: use, chresis; see Agamben 2014), Esposito explicates social practices 
and structures through a notion of  communal life, communitas. 
9  Therefore the coupling of  production and reproduction – biopolitical labor removes the distinction 
between the production and the reproduction of  society; however, it does not cancel the distinction between 
the production and reproduction of  capital as a social relation, since the latter is founded on the distinction 
between use and exchange value.  
10  The unproductive character of  Agamben’s notion of  biopolitics has been underlined earlier, also in 
reference to more orthodox interpretations of  Foucault; see Lemke 2005. 
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put man in his place, we will consequently obtain the result that the essence of man is 
nothing other than praxis through which he incessantly produces himself (Agamben 
2011, 91). 
 
According to Agamben the concept of human subjectivity that constantly produces itself is    
a secularized concept of God whose oikonomia, i.e. activity and praxis, is completely separated 
from its being to the extent that God’s economy constitutes his very being. But it 
nevertheless remains a productive practice that is aimed at a certain result, this result being in an 
extreme case its very self-production (in contrast to the inoperative contemplation and 
experiencing of man’s own potentiality; see Agamben 2011, 250–251). Jessica Whyte has 
meticulously criticized Agamben’s account of early Marx, focusing on the difference between 
a specific capitalist subsumption of labor that is the object of Marx’s critique and a despotic 
domination over the slave’s labor that was characteristic of the Aristotelian oikos (Whyte 
2014, 180). Agamben’s error, a result of his deconstruction of the Christian theology of will, 
supposedly consists in mistakenly taking the master-slave relation for a paradigm that can 
help us understand the situation of the capitalist laborer (Whyte 2014, 192). I don’t think 
Whyte is right in her critique of Agamben, but what she manages to show is that we have to 
abandon the terrain of labor – in a manner similar to the one she proposes by referring        
to Althusser and his critique of the humanist notion of labor in early Marx (Althusser 2003) – 
and move to a more general sphere of praxis that cannot be reduced to any form of labor. 
Agamben’s genealogy of economic theology, and liturgy in particular, has given us a more 
general diagram of the subsumption of praxis, one that might also be applicable to Marxist 
political economy. 
A strong critique of Agamben’s work on economic theology has been formulated by 
Alberto Toscano (2011). His argument is particularly important for the question of the 
relation between economic theology and political economy, since Toscano doesn’t focus on 
Agamben’s inability to explain contemporary changes in the labor and production processes, 
but instead shifts his critique towards the problems of division and distribution, i.e. the 
fundamental question of accumulation. Assuming an orthodox Marxist stance, Toscano 
claims that a theological genealogy of governance is incapable of explaining the unstable 
nature of capitalism which is the result of unlimited accumulation, a truly “anarchic” process, 
yet constitutive of the capitalistic organization of economy. Therefore Toscano stresses that it 
is not the problem of a genealogy of management, but of chrematistics, i.e. a science of the 
unlimited accumulation of money, that we have to undertake in order to carry out a critique 
of political economy (Toscano 2011, 130–131). Showing the importance of chrematistics 
both for Aristotle and for Marx, Toscano states that “Agamben’s theological genealogy is 
incapable of providing much insight into the (value) forms that determine (dis)order of the 
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contemporary economy” (Toscano 2011, 132), or into the problem of the communist idea of 
the administration of things (Toscano 2011, 133).  
Toscano is right that Agamben’s work is of no use when it comes to the absolutely 
fundamental question of Marxist political economy, that is, the value form. And although 
some of his remarks concerning Agamben’s method can be seen as simply malicious, his 
paper shows that it is also not to the sphere of distribution (or circulation) that we can relate 
a theological genealogy of economy. Although Agamben links the concept of a spontaneous 
order and the “invisible hand” of the market to the question of divine economy and 
providential machine (Agamben 2011, 261–287), his insight doesn’t get us nearer to the 
genealogy of the (neo)liberal concept of market than the works of, i.a., Foucault (2009; 2010), 
Harvey (2007) or Mirowski (2013).  
It is then neither the analysis of production and reproduction, nor that of labor, nor 
that of distribution and circulation, and finally: nor that of the form of value to which the 
genealogy of economic theology can contribute. But it is the problem of praxis and            
the theological genealogy of the governance of human life, the management of the effectiveness of 
human praxis, that constitutes Agamben’s proper interest and is able to offer a contribution to 
a wider, philosophical research, extending to the field of contemporary political economy. 
The problem of the “divine management”, to use the formulation from the title of Toscano’s 
paper, remains therefore an important or even pressing one, but only if we consider it to be   
a management of “worldly matters”, that is, a theological genealogy not of divine 
management of the world or God’s oikonomia, but of a liturgical management of human 
praxis. 
A theological genealogy 
But why a theological genealogy? Why does the problem of human praxis require                      
a philosophical explication within a conceptual horizon of the theology of Trinitarian 
economy and the theological question of divine providence? Agamben’s focus on theology,    
a result of his earlier investigations into the history of metaphysics, has found its fulfillment 
in the epilogue to the Homo sacer series with the introduction of the concept of destituent power. 
What in State of Exception Agamben described with reference to Benjamin’s concept of 
“studying” (Agamben 2005, 64), the result of which would be the deactivation of law, in the 
last volume of the series takes on the form of a power that “is capable of deposing every time 
the ontological-political relations by revealing the connection between their elements” 
(Agamben 2014, 344). Those elements, e.g. life and language, bare life and law, or constituent 
and constituted power, are related to each other by the logic of a metaphysical arche  
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that constitutes itself by splitting the factical experience [l’esperienza fattizia] and 
removing at the origin – that is excluding – one half that will later be rearticulated with 
the other one, included as the fundament. This is the way the city founds itself on the 
division of life between bare life and political life, human being defines itself on       
the basis of the exclusion-inclusion of the animal, the law on the basis of the exceptio 
of the anomy, the government on the basis of the exclusion of the inoperativity and 
its capture in the form of glory (Agamben 2014, 336). 
The same logical structure gives foundation both to the metaphysical discourse that relates 
human life to language, and the political philosophy that relates human life to law and 
economy: 
Just as the tradition of metaphysics has always thought the human being in a form of 
an articulation of two elements (nature and logos, body and soul, animality and 
humanity), the occidental political philosophy has always thought the political in         
a figure of a relation between two figures that it was supposed to tie together: bare life 
and power, the house and the city, violence and the instituted order, anomy (anarchy) 
and law, the multitude and the people (Agamben 2014, 344). 
What makes theology (political and economic) a privileged field of investigation into both the 
metaphysical and the political arche is the fact that theology is a rational, philosophical 
discourse on the phenomenon of revelation. Agamben’s early works on language and 
metaphysics deal precisely with the notion that the metaphysical presupposition of being as    
a sphere separated from individual entities, or the “world” as a sphere separated from worldly 
beings, is an effect of the revelation of language detached from the individual acts of 
linguistic utterance (Agamben 2006, 26). Language is the only being that always presupposes 
itself in every single enunciation, which makes it a logical model of the concept of God. In 
one of his earlier texts on language Agamben refers, probably for the first time, to the 
Trinitarian dogma in order to explicate this self-presupposing, metaphysical power of 
language: 
From this perspective, the construction of Trinitarian theology appears as the most 
rigorous and coherent way to consider the paradox of the word’s primordial status, 
which the prologue to the Gospel of John expresses in stating, en arkhē ēn ho logos, “In 
the beginning was the Word.” The Trinitarian movement of God that has become 
familiar to us through the Nicene Creed […] says nothing about worldly reality; it has 
no ontic context. Instead, it registers the new experience of the word that Christianity 
brought to the world. To use Wittgenstein’s terms, it says nothing about how the world 
is, but rather reveals that the world is, that language exists. The word that is absolutely 
in the beginning, that is therefore the absolute presupposition, presupposes nothing if 
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not itself […]; its Trinitarian structure is nothing other than the movement of its own 
self-revelation (Agamben 1999, 40–41). 
God triune is the ultimate foundation of power, not because it’s assumed to be all-powerful 
(which is a classically self-contradictory concept), but because it’s a foundation that 
presupposes only itself11. If political philosophy had always operated on the basis of the 
fundamental split, relating two elements by designating one the foundation of the other (e.g. 
bare life the foundation of the political life, anomy the foundation of the power of law), it 
was from the very beginning a political theology, i.e. a reflection on the foundation of praxis 
of the political animal endowed with language, a reflection, in the final instance, on the 
metaphysical self-foundation of language, i.e. the absolute divine power. The critique of 
metaphysics is at the same time a critique of political theology and a political philosophy      
of the animal that has language, whose praxis is always determined by the mode of its 
“having” of language12. 
It also means that a theological genealogy of power enables an investigation based 
on basic binary oppositions13. But while political philosophy is founded either on simple or 
dialectical oppositions (e.g. private/public, individual/general, civil/stately), the oppositions 
with which a theological genealogy of politics and economy is concerned are always 
subsumed to the above reconstructed logic of the division of the factual experience of praxis 
into two concepts, one subordinated to the other. The paradigmatic opposition is the one 
between potestas and auctoritas (Agamben 2005, 78–79): potestas is not an autonomous power, 
capable of acting on its own; it must be given legitimization by whomever or whatever is 
endowed with auctoritas. The auctor is the one who approves, affirms and ratifies the actions of 
the subject. The factual experience of one’s dynamis is divided between pure potentiality on 
one hand and an external instance that allows for energeia, the actualization of the potentiality, 
on the other. 
The relation between auctoritas and potestas assumes different political and 
institutional forms, from the ancient power of the senatus through the institutions of iustitium, 
interregnum, hostis iudicatio, auctoritas principis declared by Augustus, up to Führertum in which 
auctoritas assumed the form of an identity between the leader and the people (Agamben 2005, 
84). The auctoritas-potestas division constitutes the internal logic of the governmental machine 
                                               
11  Stefano Oliva (2015) summarizes this basic idea of  Agamben’s philosophy with the notion of  the 
“presupposing apparatus”. I agree with him that the logic of  metaphysical or theological presupposition is    
the key problem of  the whole Homo sacer project. 
12  One might argue that the main problem of  Agamben’s early works, especially Il linguaggio e la morte, is 
the destruction or deconstruction of  metaphysics by explicating the meaning of  the echon in Aristotle’s 
definition of  the human being. What does it mean to “have” language, Agamben asks, and answers: it is not 
language (logos) that we have, but “simply the trite words” (Agamben 2006, 94; see also Ratajczak 2013). 
13  Which Agamben himself  calls for explicitly in a reference to Hölderlin (Agamben 1998, 32–33). 
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that divides, captures and governs the praxis of men and women. In Il regno e la gloria 
Agamben writes that  
[t]he double structure of the governmental machine, which in State of Exception 
appeared in the correlation between auctoritas and potestas here takes the form of the 
articulation between Kingdom and Government and, ultimately, interrogates the very 
relation – which initially was not considered – between oikonomia and Glory, between 
power as government and effective management, and power as ceremonial and 
liturgical regality (Agamben 2011, xi–xii).  
The division between the power of acting (potestas) and the power that authorizes the action 
(auctoritas) is supplemented in the theological genealogy of economy with the division 
between Kingdom and Government and ultimately, which will interest us further, between 
economy and Glory. In order to explicate Agamben’s philosophy of praxis we have to 
reconstruct the logic of arche that lays the metaphysical and theological fundaments for the 
theology of economy which we will find in the theology of liturgy. 
Oikonomia and Glory 
The problem of the divine oikonomia of Trinitarian theology, in its political aspect, consists 
not in its opposition to “political theology”, as proclaimed by Carl Schmitt, but in its 
supplementation of it with another paradigm, that of governance. Although Agamben opens 
his book with the reconstruction of Erik Peterson’s famous argument that political theology 
is possible only in pagan religions and in Judaism (especially in the latter since it is built on 
the idea of one God and one chosen nation), but not in Christian Trinitarian monotheism 
(Agamben 2011, 10), his meticulous reconstruction of Patristic debates on the Trinitarian 
dogma shows that the doctrine of the divine oikonomia opposes God’s being and his actions 
(his economy) only to the extent that it subordinates the economy to the instance that regulates 
God’s “pragmatics”. After the term oikonomia became terminus technicus in the writings of 
Hippolytus and Tertulian, it was conceived as a form of arrangement and disposition, being 
translated later in Latin as dispositio14. In order to make “economy” into a technical term, both 
Hippolytus and Tertulian reversed the Pauline phrase “the economy of the mystery”, 
signifying the unveiling of God’s plan in the secular world, into the “mystery of the 
                                               
14  And also dispensatio, that is, a suspension of  canonical law that relieves one of  law because of  the 
exceptio, that is, the effect of  the mysterious divine action (Agamben 2011, 49). Agamben formulates it even 
more strongly: “The paradigm of  government and of  the state of  exception coincide in the idea of  an 
oikonomia, an administrative praxis that governs the course of  things, adapting at each turn, in its salvific intent, 
to the nature of  the concrete situation against which it has to measure itself ” (Agamben 2011, 50). 
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economy”; this now came to signify the true mysterion and oikonomias sacramentum, “which 
confers on economy all the semantic richness and ambiguity that means, at the same time, 
oath, consecration, and mystery” (Agamben 2011, 40). The “mysterious” aspect of God’s 
economy lies precisely in the very stake of the Patristic discourse on the Trinitarian dogma 
and its opposition to Gnosticism, that is, the reconciliation of God with the world. Therefore 
it shouldn’t be at all surprising that for Tertullian “divine monarchy now constitutively entails 
an economy, a governmental apparatus, which articulates and, at the same time, reveals its 
mystery” (Agamben 2011, 43)15. The true mysterion (or arcanum imperii) of every political (or 
economic) theology consists of articulating the two elements that were initially separated. 
When in State of Exception Agamben focused on the “empty space” of the state of exception 
that binds together law and violence, here he focuses on an activity “as such truly mysterious 
that articulates the divine being into a trinity and, at the same time, preserves and 
‘harmonizes’ it into a unity” (Agamben 2011, 39). 
 In the Trinitarian dogma, therefore, its theological basis finds the doctrine of the 
raison d’état, a secular concept that articulated the governmental apparatus with the higher 
instance determining the aim and goal of the art of government (Foucault 2008). But it is also 
a theological formulation of the metaphysical division between substance and praxis 
(Agamben 2011, 53). According to the doctrine of oikonomia, God’s praxis, his economy, is 
not grounded on his being. Theology and ontology are separated from economy and 
pragmatics, which makes God’s will truly anarchic. It is not only, according to Agamben, the 
initial formulation of the metaphysics of will, which will resurface later in Schelling and 
Nietzsche and will be traced by Heidegger throughout Western philosophy. The separation of 
being and oikonomia (action) requires a distinction within the very concept of praxis. 
Peterson’s contribution to political theology lies precisely in formulating the theological 
counterpart of the liberal separation between Kingdom and Government, which takes on the 
form of the distinction between God’s dynamis (Macht) and God’s arche (Gewalt) (Agamben 
2011, 73). Le roi règne, mais il ne governe pas is a political formulation of the theological paradigm 
that separates Kingdom (arche, Gewalt) and Governement (dynamis, Macht), positing the latter 
as free (anarchic) praxis that must be nevertheless subordinated to the instance of power. 
This very separation, as Agamben underlines it, opens up “the possibility and necessity of 
government” (Agamben 2011, 66). The Kingdom-Government opposition therefore mirrors 
that of auctoritas-potestas – in each case praxis is always divided into the possibility of acting or 
action itself, and the instance that enables the action or governs it. 
                                               
15  All the more emphatically does Agamben underline his astonishment at Peterson’s thesis on the 
impossibility of  any political theology proper to Christian monotheism, even accusing him of  conscious 
repression of  the problem of  monarchy in Patristic texts (Agamben 2011, 14). 
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 The logic of economical “mystery”, that is, the articulation of transcendence and 
immanence, God and world, Kingdom and Government, is best seen in the metaphysical 
concept of order, taxis. Medieval ontology took this Aristotelian notion and transformed it 
according to the doctrine of the divine economy. The very concept of order in its Aristotelian 
formulation joined in itself the substance with its presentation in the world, which made it an 
aporetic articulation of substance and relation (measure, number etc.). If now the being of 
God is only his oikonomia, that is ordinatio and dispositio, “praxis of government and activity that 
arranges according to measure, number and weight” (Agamben 2011, 89), then the order of 
the world becomes the effect of God’s constant creative activity that arranges things in 
relations. The world is the effect of the praxis of government, but it is also God who 
becomes this very praxis, who “is no longer only substance or thought, but also and in the 
same measure disposition, praxis” (Agamben 2011, 90).  
 The philosophical formulation of the distinction between Kingdom and 
Government is to be found in Aquinas’ concept of causes. In Il regno e la gloria Agamben 
reconstructs his theory of primal and secondary causes, which not only explicates the 
Aristotelian notion of taxis in the new Christian conceptual horizon, but also gives theoretical 
fundaments to the doctrine of providence. The relations between things, elements of the 
world, are only secondary causes, according to Aquinas. Every secondary cause is also 
determined (we should probably say “overdetermined”) by the primal cause, which refers the 
worldly relations to the order of the divine dispositio. The problem that interests Agamben is 
“the way in which the first cause governs created things while remaining transcendent with 
regard to them” (Agamben 2011, 95). The distinction between primal causes and secondary 
causes enables the distinction between general providence and special providence (Agamben 
2011, 94–95) and represents the scholastic attempt to articulate transcendence with 
immanence, the general with the particular. The praxis of governance is possible because it is 
separated from the Kingdom and at the same time subordinated to it, which amounts to the 
necessary articulation of the general providence (understood also as the history of salvation) 
with special providence (relations in the world), or in Foucault’s terms – omnes et singulatim 
(Agamben 2011, 114).  
 In Opus Dei Agamben returns to Aquinas’ philosophy of causes but approaches it 
from a different angle – from the point of view of the genealogy of sacramental effectiveness. 
In order to explicate the efficacy of the sacrament, Aquinas adds a fifth type of cause to the 
Aristotelian doctrine of four causes: the instrumental cause (Agamben 2013a, 52). An action 
is efficacious instrumentally only when it acts according to its nature and is moved by the 
principal agent (like the ax that is an instrument of the lumberjack cutting down a tree). 
Therefore the sacrament is effective not only because of the actions performed by the priest, 
but also because he acts as an instrument of God’s will. The concept of sacramental 
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effectiveness coincides with that of divine oikonomia and divine providence: the realization of 
God’s economy within the world and history is subordinated to the immanent economy of 
the Trinity (which turns the two economies into one), the secondary causes constituting the 
special providence are subordinated to the general providence, and, according to the same 
logic, the actions of people in the world are truly effective only when considered as 
instruments of God (actions realizing the divine economy in the world).  
 The theological notion of oikonomia presents therefore an aporetic concept of praxis 
that is both unfounded and subordinated. The separation of God’s being from his action – 
the separation of theology from economy and ontology from pragmatics – discloses the lack 
of a proper fundament for praxis, life and language, but at the same time captures them in the 
division between the special/immanent and general/transcendent, articulating the two 
dimensions in a manner unattainable for the subject of praxis. It is therefore the very logic of 
this articulation that constitutes the basis and grounding of praxis16. The articulation 
constitutes the proper oikonomias sacramentum, the sacramental and mysterious character of the 
concept of the unfounded, and hence free, praxis bequeathed to Western philosophy by      
the Trinitarian dogma. The political problem of divine oikonomia now consists precisely of 
envisioning a form of worldly praxis of men and women which would be the structural 
counterpart of God’s oikonomia, subordinating the free actions to the divine economy. 
The theological dispositive that articulates worldly actions with God’s economy, 
subsuming therefore human praxis under the split between Kingdom and Government (but 
also between auctoritas/potestas), is Glory. The theology of Glory, i.e. doxology, is preoccupied 
with the problem of the rearticulation of the division, both between the persons within the 
immanent economy (Father-Son-Holy Spirit) and between God and the world. Glory is      
the term that signifies the basic, fundamental relation between transcendence and 
immanence: 
As we have already seen with regard to the term “order”, which means as much          
a transcendent relation with God (ordo ad Deum) as a property immanent in creatures 
(ordo ad invicem), so glory is at once as essential attribute of God and something that 
creatures owe to him and that expresses their relation to him. Moreover, in the same 
way that the dual meaning of the term “order” ultimately ends up befitting the very 
essence of God, so the ambiguity of the term “glory” makes of it the name that 
defines God’s most intimate nature (Agamben 2011, 214). 
                                               
16  This figure of  articulation as (metaphysical) grounding appears for the first time in Il linguaggio e la morte 
(Agamben 2006) in the figure of  mute Voice, which presents the negative grounding of  the human disposition 
to speak. 
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The proper problem of economic theology, according to Agamben, is not so much Glory as 
glorification, the praxis of praising God and his economy. The difference between Glory      
as an attribute of God and glorification as a praxis of the creation is nevertheless inherent in 
the very theological concept of Glory, which reproduces the aporetic articulation present in 
the notion of divine oikonomia. Glory denotes a mode of God’s existence and a mode of 
participation in God’s existence, joining the two aspects to the extent that it comes to 
conceptualize the existence of God as dependent on the activity of glorification (Agamben 
2011, 221). God exists only because the world he created praises him – and the world praises 
him because it was created by God. Glorification is at the same time concerned with ontology 
(“to be”) and ethics, understood here as having-to-be17: God has to be praised in order to be; 
the worldly creatures were created in order to uphold God in his existence through praise. 
 It becomes clear why Agamben analyzes Glory as a theological dispositive that 
captures the inoperative character of human praxis (Agamben 2011, 245). The distinctive 
character of human life is the absence of any work or task the fulfillment of which should be 
the aim and goal of politics or ethics proper to the animal that has language (Agamben 2007). 
The theological paradigm of divine economy is a paradigm of praxis that is free, ungrounded, 
but at the same time directed towards the realization of an abstract, empty task of glorifying 
the divine praxis of governing the world, i.e. God’s economy. The distinction between 
Kingdom and Government isn’t only a theological formulation of the liberal paradigm of 
governance, but is itself based on the idea if oikonomia, praxis that is free only insofar as it 
realizes and fulfills the a priori principle (general providence, immanent economy of the 
Trinity, history of salvation etc.).  
The analogy with the liberal concept of the market is striking. The principle of 
Smith’s “invisible hand” reproduces the articulation between “immanence” and 
“transcendence” that we have seen in the case of the concepts of order and providence. The 
theological genealogy of economy allowed Agamben to deconstruct the apparent opposition 
between “naturalism” and “providentialism” (an order based on the needs of the “stomach” 
in the first case and an order envisioned previously in God’s “brain”) which drove 
discussions among supporters of the free market in the 18th century, and to relate the natural 
order of the market back to the governmental machine founded on the distinction between 
Kingdom and Government: 
If it is probable that the Smithian image of the invisible hand is to be understood, in 
this sense, as the action of an immanent principle, our reconstruction of the bipolar 
machine of the theological oikonornia has shown that there is no conflict between 
                                               
17  Agamben analyses this aporetic link between “to be” and “having-to-be” more precisely in Opus Dei 
(Agamben 2013, 118–125).  
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“providentialism” and “naturalism” within it, because the machine functions precisely 
by correlating a transcendent principle with an immanent order. Just as with the 
Kingdom and the Government, the intradivine trinity and the economic trinity, so    
the “brain” and the “stomach” are nothing but two sides of the same apparatus, of the 
same oikonomia, within which one of the two poles can, at each turn, dominate         
the other (Agamben 2011, 284–285)18. 
But the deconstruction of the natural “order” of the market isn’t the only contribution that 
Agamben’s theological genealogy of economy can make to political economy19. The concept 
of taxis, “order”, is founded on the separation between Kingdom and Government, which we 
have already seen is a different formulation – in a theological-economical conceptual key – of 
the potestas-auctoritas division, between power to act and power that enables and legitimizes the 
act. We can say that this separation of dynamis from arche (or Macht from Gewalt) founds the 
very possibility of governing and managing the lives of men and women, the human praxis in 
all its forms – including labor. If so, capitalism as an economic regime that governs and 
regulates the labor of men and women in order to valorize capital – the true God of modern 
times – must be founded on its own version of this division – and the articulation of the 
divided elements: which constitutes its own logic of conditioning the effectiveness and 
legitimization of praxis. A change of perspective is necessary. In order to relate the 
theological genealogy of economy to political economy, we need to go beyond the concept of 
market and investigate the form of praxis that market presupposes. We already know that it is 
a free and subordinated praxis – but how is this subordination to be understood? What are 
the metaphysical conditions of the capitalist governance of labor and, generally speaking, life? 
In order to give preliminary responses to these questions, we have to include in our 
investigations the political theology of liturgy. 
                                               
18  This passage from Il regno e la gloria is one of  the most important of  Agamben’s contributions to the 
genealogy of  modern liberalism and its “biopolitics”. The spontaneity of  the market is “natural” only insofar as 
the actions of  the participants in the market follow one principle, which makes market a “governable” sphere 
of  praxis. See also notes by Foucault: “If  we take things up a bit further, if  we see them up at their origin, you 
can see that what characterizes this new art of  government I have spoken about would be much more              
a naturalism than liberalism, inasmuch as the freedom that the physiocrats and Adam Smith talk about is much  
more the spontaneity, the internal and intrinsic mechanics of  economic processes than a juridical freedom of  
the individual recognized as such” (Foucault 2010, 61). 
19  And it is also not the most important one. Investigations into the theological roots of  Smith’s concept 
of  the “invisible hand” have been an important field of  research at least since the publication of  the famous 
article by Jacob Viner Adam Smith and laissez faire (Viner 1927; see also Oslington 2012). Many researches 
(including also those of  Benjamin M. Friedman, Peter Harrison and Emma Rothschild) have pointed towards 
stoicism, Scottish Calvinism, British Scientific Natural Theology and the concept of  the Natural Law as 
possible theological influences on Smith’s thinking (see Oslington 2011, Rothschild 2002). Agamben’s 
contribution to these debates may nevertheless consist of  referring Smith’s concept of  natural order to the 
Trinitarian theology and also of  a deeply philosophical reading of  this theological tradition. 
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Liturgy and office 
According to Peterson, liturgy is the proper Christian form of politics. In opposition to 
Schmitt, for whom political theology must be based on the power of Christian imperium, 
Peterson separates Augustine’s two Kingdoms, leaving it up to the Church to join the 
celestial and worldly forms of power: “the cult of the celestial Church and, therefore, also    
the liturgy of the earthly Church that is bound to the celestial, have an originary relation with 
the world of politics” (Peterson 1994, 202; see also Agamben 2011, 145). This “originary 
relation” is theologically grounded on the doctrine of Glory: liturgy is a form of worldly, 
organized praxis aimed at the glorification of God. The political significance of liturgy 
consists of participating through the glorification of the creator in his Glory, thus creating     
a worldly public sphere for the members of the Church as a sphere of the communal praise. 
Leitourgia, after all, means a “work” (ergon), a service performed for the people (laos). The 
separation of Kingdom from Government excludes the possibility of any political theology in 
Schmitt’s sense – of a direct, “miraculous”, sovereign intervention in the realm of worldly 
politics. But it is the praise of the Kingdom, the principle of the general providence, that is in 
itself political, since it affirms the “order” in the world – but only the order that aims at the 
subordination of worldly relations (effects of the “free” will of people) to the divine economy 
(history of salvation). By exhorting heis theos [one God], the Church as a community submits 
to the transcendent instance and creates its own public sphere in the form of a ceremony 
(Agamben 2011, 168). The genealogy of the ceremonial aspect of power constitutes               
a significant part of Agamben’s investigations into economic theology (see Agamben 2011, 
167–196). Nevertheless, the aspect of liturgical action that interests us here is not so much 
ceremony as effectiveness: 
The mystery of the liturgy is, in this sense, the mystery of effectiveness, and only if 
one understands this arcane secret is it possible to understand the enormous influence 
that this praxis, which is only apparently separate, has exercised on the way in which 
modernity has thought both its ontology and its ethics, its politics and its economy 
(Agamben 2013a, xii). 
The “mystery” of the liturgy corresponds to the mystery of the divine economy, i.e. the 
articulation of the transcendent principle, presupposed as the aim and goal that enables       
the governance of the taxis, with the immanent order. An “effective” action in this sense is an 
action that joins the worldly order to the general principle of that order. The “effectiveness” 
of liturgy was thus perfect in the person of Jesus Christ – a worldly incarnation of God and 
simultaneously an element of the immanent economy of the Trinity – who, as the highest 
priest, was the subject of actions that were all perfectly effective. The mystery of Christ’s 
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economical effectiveness was later transformed into the doctrine of the “ministry” of liturgy. 
With the translation of the Greek mysterion into Latin as sacrament, the effectiveness of 
liturgical practice, that is the subsumption of praxis of every member of the Church under 
the principle of God’s Kingdom, came to be formulated in the doctrine of sacramental 
effectiveness (Agamben 2013a, 16). In order to be effective, the liturgical action must 
articulate praxis in the world with the general instance of the worldly order.  
The form of this liturgical “originary relation”, which we could also term “liturgical 
subsumption of praxis”, isn’t limited, according to Agamben, to the Church’s doctrine of the 
sacrament or praise (exhorting heis theos or singing hymns to the Glory of God). To put it 
otherwise, if the state of exception reduced any form of life to bare life, to the biological 
foundation of political or ethical life, the political theology of liturgy gives birth to many 
different forms of life, all nevertheless subordinated to participation in God’s Glory. In 
Altissima povertà Agamben traces the liturgical subsumption of praxis to the concept of regula 
vitae of the monastic life, according to which the monks were to “construct their life as a total 
and unceasing liturgy or Divine Office” (Agamben 2013b, xii). The separation of regula and 
vita, in the same manner as auctoritas was separated from potestas and Kingdom from 
Government, introduced a new concept of the governance of life, one based on the 
subsumption of life under the a priori formulated rule of conduct that encompasses all aspects 
of life in its entirety. Probably the best example of the liturgical subsumption of praxis in 
monastic life was the imperative of the incessant study of the text of the regula itself. The 
monk should spend as much time as possible in reading the text of the monastic rules or, 
should that be impossible, in meditating on the text and reciting it from memory (Agamben 
2013b, 77–78). The reading or recitation of the text of the regula, which itself prescribes its 
own reading or recitation by the monk, is a form of perfectly self-referential and thus 
absolutely effective liturgical practice: just as with the aporetic articulation of “being” and 
“having-to-be” in the concept of Glory, the liturgy of monastic life is perfectly realized in      
a praxis of following the rule that prescribes only obedience to itself. The self-referential 
character of the rule that one must recite and read the rule is the most abstract form of the 
monastic praxis that illustrates the general structure of the liturgical subsumption of praxis 
under the regula vitae: the idea of making every moment of life and every form of action          
a realization of a rule and hence of liturgy: 
As meditatio renders lectio potentially continuous, so every gesture of the monk, all the 
most humble manual activities become a spiritual work and acquire the liturgical status 
of an opus Dei. And precisely this continuous liturgy is the challenge and novelty of 
monasticism, which the Church was not slow to pick up on, seeking to introduce, 
albeit within certain limits, the totalitarian demand proper to the monastic cult into 
cathedral worship as well (Agamben 2013b, 83). 
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Hence the detailed rules concerning the monk’s diet, clothing, and daily schedule; generally 
speaking: his habit, habitus. But it is precisely this liturgization of life and vivification of liturgy 
(Agamben 2013b, 82) that makes the monastic form of liturgy specific and different from the 
liturgy of the Church, although the latter had incessantly sought to reconcile the “two 
liturgies” – the liturgy of monastic life and the liturgy of the priestly ministry. Because of this 
difference Agamben penetrates the archives of regulae vitae, especially the Franciscan one, 
underlining the distinction between the two liturgies in order to delineate a possible concept 
of a form-of-life, a form of practice that would elude the liturgical subsumption of praxis. But in 
order to do that – and also in order to reconstruct his political philosophy of praxis – it isn’t 
sufficient to just reverse somewhat the relation between regula and vita. It is also necessary to 
reconstruct the liturgical structure of effectiveness and move beyond the presupposed 
structures conditioning the effectiveness of human praxis. 
The liturgical effectiveness of monastic life consisted in subordinating every aspect 
of the monk’s life, every form of worldly action, to the rule that prescribed a specific way in 
which this action should be carried out. The action realized the liturgy of monastic life 
because it was carried out in a specific manner, according to the rule, and the rule existed 
only in the actions performed according to the rule. The monk who doesn’t live according to 
a specific form of life is not a monk. By contrast, the priest realizes the ministry whose 
effectiveness is independent of the way he leads his life (Agamben 2013b, 84). The sacrament 
granted by the priest is effective because of the priestly office, because the priest is the 
instrument of God’s will, i.e. his economy. According to the doctrine of the sacrament,         
the priest’s action is divided into opus operantis, i.e. the very worldly action of the subject with its 
physical characteristics, and opus operatum, i.e. the effective, liturgical reality of the sacrament 
(Agamben 2013a, 21). Sacrament is the mystical (i.e. sacramental) unity of these two aspects of 
priestly action. In the ecclesiastic liturgy of the office, the division between regula and vita, the 
metaphysical basis for the liturgy of the monastic life, takes the form of the division between 
opus operantis and opus operatum. An action is effective only insofar as it is also opus operatum, that 
is, as it realizes God’s economy in the world. The principle of the action’s effectiveness is not 
an element of the subject’s action and – as we have seen before in case of other oppositions 
traced by Agamben in his theological genealogy – the mystical articulation of opus operantis and 
opus operatum is unattainable for the subject of the action. The articulation of the two elements 
lies beyond the sphere of the subject’s action, but still constitutes the fundament of its 
effectiveness. 
The two liturgies present two different forms of the liturgical subsumption of praxis. 
The first form, the liturgy of the monastic life, concerns the way the action is carried out: it 
makes a certain form of praxis effective only insofar as it is performed according to the rule. 
It is a disciplinary form of governance of life, molding an individual’s form of life in every 
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possible aspect. Today we can see this form of governance active in corporations or in books 
advocating the “entrepreneurship of the self” (Bröckling 2007) and issuing an endless list of 
rules of conduct in order to perform the liturgy of modern enterprise. The second form, the 
liturgy of the office, is not interested in the form of the action, that is, in the way it is 
performed, but subsumes praxis as it is, as opera operantis, under the principle that grants it 
effectiveness or confirms its effective character. It is not the question of the conduct, of life, 
but of the instance that grants life sacramental effectiveness. In the first liturgy the ethical and 
even physical aspects of the subject are taken into account in determining the effective 
character of monastic life. In the second liturgy the subject is just a carrier of the action, the 
effective character of which is decided according to the office. 
The management of effectiveness and productivity 
Emanuel Alloa stresses the fact that economic theology is first of all interested in the 
problem of diversity – and the management of this diversity (Alloa 2015, 300). The economy 
of the flow of glory between the persons in the Trinity (immanent economy) and between the 
Trinity and the world would set the paradigm of the management of life (in theological terms: 
the creation) and the taxis of the world. Our focus on the concept of liturgy is intended to 
show that it is not only the flow of glory, the economy of glory, but far more the liturgy, or as we 
call it “the liturgical subsumption of praxis”, that constitutes the theological paradigm for the 
management of the living. In the genealogy of the liturgical praxis – the praise of God’s 
name, the monastic regula or the ecclesiastic office – Agamben was able to reconstruct the 
paradigm of effectiveness that enables the management of the praxis of men and women. For 
how is it possible to manage the praxis of the multitude? The aim is not so much to govern 
all area of worldly praxis by taking into account the intentions of the subjects of praxis or 
their effects in the world alone, as to set an instance determining the effectiveness of the 
praxis independently of the actions themselves. What counts in the liturgical subsumption of 
praxis is the function of a given action in the service of God, i.e. as a realization of his 
oikonomia (Agamben 2013a, 25). The liturgical reality of praxis is, according to the Church’s 
doctrine of sacraments, its effective reality, its Wirklichkeit, a reality that is effective and that 
effectuates. For this reason Agamben states that the liturgy sets the paradigm for the 
ontology of effectiveness, in which “being is inseparable from its effects; it names being 
insofar as it is effective, produces certain effects, and at the same time is determined by 
them” (Agamben 2013a, 41).  
 But liturgy is not only an ontological paradigm; it is also a paradigm of praxis, 
including a model of the subject of praxis. Just as, according to the doctrine of glory, God is 
only his oikonomia, so the subject of liturgical praxis is only this praxis as opus operatum. But at 
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the same time, just as the concept of God’s economy entails an aporetic relation between 
God and creation – in which the worldly creatures were created in order to praise God, that 
exists only because of this glorification – so the liturgical subsumption of praxis entails an 
aporetic articulation between being and duty (having-to-be) that “institutes a circular relation between 
being and praxis, by which the priest’s being defines his praxis and his praxis, in turn, defines his being” 
(Agamben 2013a, 81). It is not a paradigm of praxis defining being (existentia that determines 
essentia), but a circular and aporetic articulation of praxis that realizes a being with a being that 
exists only as effectuated by a certain form of praxis. This is why the liturgical subsumption 
of praxis coincides with the notion of taxis, but also sets the paradigm for a market 
subjectivity: the subject of liturgical praxis is at the same time being and relation. Although this 
definition of the subject (as at the same time a being in relation and the relation itself) is 
generally true for the human being as the subject of language (Virno 2011, 33), in the case of 
the liturgical subsumption the subject of praxis is related, in its being, to a divine economy (the 
principle of order or the “invisible hand of the market”); that is, to the instance of the worldly 
order and not to the world or worldly beings. This is precisely the reason why the theological 
doctrine of economy and liturgy establishes the paradigm for the management of the living: 
by introducing the paradigm of effectiveness, it defines the multitude as beings that need to 
be effectuated by their praxis, the effectiveness of which is determined by an instance (in the 
case of the ecclesiastic liturgy – the Church)20 that remains transcendent to this praxis. The 
liturgical subsumption includes the praxis (life) of men and women only to the extent that it 
excludes it (that is, includes it as an animate instrument of God’s economy, but excludes it as 
a simple, worldly praxis).  
 This aporetic concept of liturgical effectiveness constitutes the most important 
difference between the monastic and ecclesiastical liturgies. The monastic liturgy, the 
vivification of liturgy in the monastic regula, reduces the effectiveness of praxis to                
the realization of the monastic rule. The aporetic articulation of being and having-to-be is in 
this case reduced to the introduction of the highest rule that prescribes the lectio or meditatio 
aimed at repeating (out loud or in the monk’s head) the text of the regula. Just as the absolute 
performative, i.e. the sentence “I speak”, is always a felicitous performative (Virno 2015, 49), 
since it refers solely to its own linguistic reality, so does the reading and repeating of the text 
of the regula represent the maximum of liturgical effectiveness, since the aim of the monastic 
liturgy is to uphold the regula constituting the monastic koinos bios. In the terminology of 
                                               
20  We might pose a question here about the extent to which Agamben’s genealogy of  liturgy contributes 
to the famous thesis by Max Weber that capitalism developed out of  the protestant work ethic (Weber 2013), 
namely: to what extent was the development of  the protestant work ethic only an institutional transformation 
of  the paradigm of  the liturgical subsumption of  praxis – that is, a renunciation of  the Church as the instance 
determining the effectiveness of  praxis, but without the renunciation of  the concept of  liturgy as a proper 
form of  Christian ethics and politics? 
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speech acts one can differentiate between the two liturgies on the basis of the possibility of 
felicity, i.e. effectiveness: while the monastic liturgy enables the felicity of the liturgical praxis 
– a realization, although not a fulfillment, of the rule, the liturgy of the sacrament is founded on 
the office of the priest, in which “the opus operantis can coincide with the opus operatum only    
on condition of being distinguished from it and can be distinguished from it only on 
condition of disappearing into it”: which means that “its felicity is its infelicity and its 
infelicity is its felicity” (Agamben 2013a, 25). In other words, the action of the priest can 
never be considered effective on its own merit alone. The self-referential character of the 
monastic regula (that prevents fulfillment but enables realization of the rule) is transposed 
here into an aporetic structure of the ecclesiastical office and the subjectivity of the priest. It 
is now because of the office – of a metaphysical quality or disposition of the subject – that 
praxis can be effective. In the concept of the priestly office, the Aristotelian separation of 
dynamis and energeia ceases to denote two different modes of being and becomes a diagram     
of effectiveness (Agamben 2013a, 91–92), whereby a certain disposition, a certain dynamis, 
determines that the actions of the priest are effective, but this very dynamis exists only insofar 
as it is being effectuated. It is therefore the ecclesiastical liturgy of the sacrament that sets the 
proper paradigm for the management of the living, subordinating the free praxis of            
the multitude to an instance that determines the effectiveness, i.e. felicity of its praxis. Which 
also means that it determines the political character of the life of the multitude. 
 Agamben’s genealogy of liturgy therefore prepares the ground for a truly political 
philosophy of praxis which should consist not only of analyzing different forms of praxis 
(e.g. communicative praxis, exchange, manual labor, care for others), but also of exploring 
the structural, institutional and metaphysical mechanisms determining these forms of praxis 
as belonging to a certain sphere (economy, politics, ethics, etc.) or as realizing certain 
processes aimed at producing certain effects. The liturgical subsumption of praxis sets, 
according to Agamben, a general paradigm of the “effectiveness” of praxis independently of 
the material qualities of the actions of the subjects of praxis. It is now becoming clear why 
Agamben has made the proper task of his philosophy to think the inoperativity of human life. 
For it is precisely this inoperativity that escapes the liturgical subsumption, and it is the 
inoperativity that constitutes a paradigm of a perfectly worldly praxis, not aimed at realizing any 
task, any work; or rather, not being effectuated in order to fulfill a certain task.  
 The question of a determination of praxis by a transcendent instance through 
effectuation is precisely the point at which Agamben’s political philosophy crosses paths with 
political economy. The theological genealogy of economy deals with the problem of 
metaphysical presuppositions of the management of praxis. These metaphysical 
presuppositions operate, as we’ve shown earlier, by dividing the factual praxis into two 
elements and setting one as the fundament for the other. The very engine of this 
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metaphysical operation was language, because of its pre-suppositional character which is 
paradigmatic for any concept of political theology and metaphysics (ontology). But there is an 
additional presupposing force in the modern world, no less divine than language – capital. 
The famous unpublished sixth chapter of the first volume of Capital, known more widely as 
Results of the Direct Production Process, is one of the best examples of Marx’s deconstruction of 
the metaphysical fundaments of capitalist societies (Marx 2009). Marx deals here not so much 
with the metaphysical appearance of commodity exchange, as with the metaphysical 
determination of labor as productive and unproductive. He describes, with perfect clarity, the self-
presupposing power of capital, whereby the capitalist relationships of production not only 
result in the commodity form of the products, but presuppose the commodity form of all 
elements of the production process, and the wage relation as the only possible labor relation 
(Marx 2009, 22)21. Here is the very “mythic violence” (Benjamin 1996) of capital. And, in the 
same metaphysical manner, capitalist relations are founded on the fundamental division and 
the rearticulation of the divided elements: it is not only the commodity that is a sensible unity 
of the use and exchange value, but it is also the process of labor that is a unity of the process 
of labor (producing use value) and valorization (producing exchange value, valorizing capital) 
(Marx 2009, 70). The presupposing power of capital not only transforms all elements of the 
production process and the effects of previous labor (dead labor) into capital, establishing the 
process of circulation of commodities as the source of all being, but also makes the process 
of valorization into the opus operatum for every form of labor. The fundamental logic of the 
liturgical subsumption of praxis, i.e. the division between opus operantis and opus operatum, is 
reproduced in capitalism, as Marx presents it, in the division between productive and 
unproductive labor22. Marx introduces the discussion on the productivity of labor just after he 
finishes the analysis of the real subsumption of labor, i.e. the development of the properly 
capitalistic form of production, which has as one of its effects the tendency to transform all 
forms of labor into productive labor. A labor is productive only insofar as it is an element of the process 
of valorization. Marx formulates it bluntly in a manner that replicates the logic of the 
effectiveness of the liturgical praxis: 
                                               
21  This metaphysical presupposing power of  capital is probably best analyzed by different theorists 
working with the notion of  primitive accumulation. The very violence, the “secret” of  primitive accumulation 
is a necessary element in introducing the capitalist relations of  production, since capital, according to its 
defining notion, has no beginning; it presupposes itself  as its own source; see e.g. De Angelis 2001.  
22  Marx discusses the concept of  productivity of  labor in a more historical manner in Theories of  the surplus 
value, but it is first of  all the texts of  the Results… that present his understanding of  the division between 
productive and unproductive labor in the wider, more systematic context of  the development of  capitalistic 
relations of  production and the subsumption of  labor under capital. 
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Only this worker is productive, whose process of labor is – to the productive process 
of the consumption of his potential to work [Arbeitsvermögens] – the bearer of this 
work [der Träger dieser Arbeit] – by the capital or a capitalist (Marx 2009, 123). 
One of the effects of the subsumption of labor under capital is the transformation of the 
worker into a “bearer of work”, or better – the installment in his subjectivity of                  
the disposition, the potentiality to work23 (Ratajczak 2014). But he is only this bearer insofar 
as this capacity to work is effectuated productively, i.e. according to the oikonomia of capital 
(valorization of value) by the capitalist, the owner of the means of production or of financial 
capital. Marx stresses the fact that the productive character of labor is independent of its form, 
content, or even the wage relation (Marx 2009, 124–125): a worker can receive a wage for e.g. 
educating the children of the capitalist, but then he is not considered a productive worker, i.e. 
he is not directly valorizing capital. To put it otherwise, the productive labor is a (mystical) 
unity of opus operantis and opus operatum, a process of labor and a process of valorization. The 
instance that determines this mystical union is capital or a capitalist that uses, actualizes the 
worker’s potential. What follows is that only those workers have the capacity to work whose 
capacity can be effectuated productively by capital.  
Productive labor and productive laborer are aporetic concepts, repeating almost without 
distinction the aporetic logic of the divine oikonomia and the liturgy of officium: the productive 
laborer must be effectuated by capital in order to be productive, and capital exists only 
because there are forms of praxis that can valorize it. A productive laborer has the potential 
to work productively, but only if it is effectuated by capital – he is therefore this abstract 
potential, but he also has to actualize it in order to be this potential. He is what he is, but also 
is the extent to which he is the relation between his potential (his being) and capital. The 
divine self-presupposing power of capital changes the multiple forms of social praxis in order 
to effectuate them productively: in order to become productive, a form of praxis must be made 
into a potential to be actualized, which also means measured, coded, compared, etc. and 
separated from other forms of praxis. It is precisely this installment of the relation to actualize 
the capacity to work, together with the appropriation of the means of work and subsistence, that 
constitutes the proper political power of capital as social relation. It sets the process of 
valorization as the fundament, as opus operatum, against which the forms of praxis are 
measured and determined. This political power becomes all the more evident with the 
development of cognitive and finance-driven capitalism, in which the accumulation of value 
is conducted outside of the production process, on the basis of the processes of circulation and 
                                               
23  The word Arbeitsvermögen is of  course a common noun in the German language, used by Marx as           
a synonym for Arbeitskraft, work force. But it shouldn’t be treated as a merely lexical question, since Vermögen 
means precisely capacity or even disposition. What’s more, in Results… Marx uses the classical philosophical 
distinction between dynamis and energeia abundantly to describe the properly capitalistic relations of  production. 
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social reproduction (Marazzi 2011, 48), and of an increasing number of dispositifs to intercept 
the value created by social labor without transforming it into productive labor (which would 
mean, apart from other things, some form of income for the productive activity). It is            
a specific, economic state of exception, which operates on the labor/valorization division and 
defines the paradigmatic form of praxis as productive labor (unity of the process of labor        
and the process of valorization), but simultaneously excludes a growing portion of activities 
as unproductive (as simply labor, or rather simply life) – a matter of the private lives of the 
individuals (e.g. biological reproduction) or public matter (e.g. cultural or academic 
production) and creates new forms of life (e.g. the entrepreneurs of the self) on the basis of 
their potential to actualize their productive potential.  
The unity of labor and the valorization process is becoming more and more questionable 
in contemporary capitalism, which creates processes of valorization independent of labor (e.g. 
high-frequency trading) and deprives more and more forms of labor of the quality of being 
“productive”. But the violence of capitalism, an effect of its divine, presupposing power, 
consists of maintaining its general framework despite the social and technological changes 
that make it dysfunctional. It is in this sense metaphysical, or even theological, since it is 
based on the paradigm of effectiveness that we have inherited from metaphysics and 
theology. Contemporary investigations into economic theology can therefore presuppose the 
grounds for thinking beyond the concept of subjectivity and praxis that are still present in    
the way we envision social relations in capitalist societies – the relation of debt, the 
productivity of labor, the ownership of oneself and one’s body, the development of “human 
capital”, etc. It is then not a matter of replacing political economy with economic theology, 
nor even of correcting research in the field of political economy from a theological point of 
view, but of rethinking the problem of praxis and subjectivity which is also present at the 
heart of political economy. 
Agamben’s theological genealogy of economy can thus be perceived not only as       
a theological genealogy of the concept of market, but far more in terms of its elaboration of 
the political aspect of liturgy, as a theological genealogy of the concept of productive labor. It is 
a theological-economic concept (appearing already in the first concepts of modern political 
economy: in the physiocrats, Smith and Ricardo) that joins a certain form of praxis (certain 
forms of labor) with capital in a manner elaborated in the liturgical notion of the office, 
which joins the worldly praxis with God’s oikonomia. Capital is not only an accumulation of 
value, it is also an actualization of productive labor – which also means the force that makes social labor 
productive (“productive” in the sense analyzed and criticized by Marx). And productive labor is 
a form of praxis that valorizes capital – which also means a form of praxis that upholds the 
existence of capital, that requires capital in order to be effectuated, to exist. Productive labor 
cannot exist without capital and capital cannot exist without productive labor – both notions presuppose 
Praktyka Teoretyczna 3(17)/2015 
 
100 
each other in the aporetic and circular manner that we have seen operating in the concept of 
the liturgical subsumption of praxis. The “productive” character of labor is as much an issue 
of “economics” as an effect of social struggles (like the struggle for wages for housework; see 
Federici 2012) and a metaphysical problem of the “effectiveness” of being. The critique of 
“productivity” of labor should become the object not only of the contemporary critique       
of political economy and social transformation, as we can see it e.g. in Guy Standing’s critique 
of the distinction between (productive) labor and (unproductive) work (Standing 2014), but 
also of a philosophical critique of praxis, ethics and politics. The “productivity” of labor (or 
life, for that matter) in capitalism is just as much a metaphysical notion of a “form” of labor, 
as the value form is a metaphysical notion of wealth (or of the common), and should be 
criticized through notions and investigations that go beyond the vocabulary of political 
economy towards the critique of the metaphysical residue present in economic notions. 
Economic theology therefore constitutes a preliminary research field for a political 
philosophy of praxis that will be able to introduce a non-capitalistic form of praxis, one that 
goes beyond the “productive” (or “effective”) character of human – and also not human – 
life. 
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TYTUŁ: Boskie zarządzanie świeckimi sprawami. Agambenowska teologiczna genealogia 
ekonomii jako polityczna filozofia praktyki 
ABSTRAKT: Celem tego artykułu jest przedstawienie takiej interpretacji Agambenowskiej 
teologicznej genealogii ekonomii, która ukaże jej znaczenie dla badań w obszarze ekonomii 
politycznej. Jedynym sposobem na powiązanie dyskursów teologii ekonomicznej i ekonomii 
politycznej jest pokazanie, że teologia ekonomiczna nie zajmuje się kwestiami przynależnymi 
do sfery ekonomii, lecz podejmuje dużo bardziej ogólny problem – problem ludzkiej 
praktyki. Postaram się udowodnić, że stawką Agambenowskiej filozofii jest krytyka 
teologicznych, a więc metafizycznych, założeń koncepcji ludzkiej praktyki, którą to krytykę 
można przeprowadzić za pomocą teologicznej genealogii, w szczególności trynitarnej 
ekonomii. Artykuł skupia się na pojęciu liturgii i jego roli w Agambenowskich badaniach 
genealogicznych jako teologicznym paradygmacie kapitalistycznego zarządzania ludzkim 
życiem (czyli praktyką) i kończy się rozważaniami nad możliwą aplikacją Agambenowskiej 
teologicznej genealogii ekonomii do marksistowskiej krytyki ekonomii politycznej, przede 
wszystkim do krytyki podziału na pracę produkcyjną i nieprodukcyjną. 
SŁOWA KLUCZOWE: teologia ekonomiczna, teologia polityczna, ekonomia, chwała, 
liturgia, praktyka, praca, efektywność, produkcyjność, Giorgio Agamben, Karol Marks 
